Introduction
How product costs estimated by a firm's cost accounting system may relate to its product prices is a question that has long been of interest to accounting researchers. In most theoretical models of pricing behavior, simple full cost based pricing rules from practice are found to be sub-optimal. One aspect that has received increased attention in recent years is whether the cost based methods may serve as simple heuristics that are adequate, though not sufficient, in solving the firm's pricing and resource allocation problems (Balachandran, Balakrishnan, and Sivaramakrishnan 1997 , Banker and Hughes 1994 , Hansen and Magee 1993 . Our paper extends this branch of research by investigating how accounting based heuristics help solve pricing and capacity decisions for a service company. We find that some simple decentralized heuristics are adequate in the sense that they allow the firm to approach the profits generated from the complex optimal solutions.
Our basic model is of a service company, such as a muffler replacement facility, that determines both the amount of service capacity and the service price each period. Based upon the price, a stochastic number of customers will place service orders. If too many orders arrive in a period, the firm will offer a price discount to those customers willing to backorder and accept service the next period. The optimal pricing and capacity rules are fairly complex and interdependent in this setting. Therefore, we investigate the extent to which three relatively simple and decentralized heuristics lead to expected profits that approach the optimal profits.
The first heuristic, termed the Simple Certainty Heuristic, is based upon the firm's behavior when it ignores the stochasticity of customer orders. In this case, the firm balances the facility and chooses capacity equal to expected demand. The optimal pricing rule is to set the price to equal full costs plus the inverse hazard rate.
The second and the third heuristics are extensions of the Simple Certainty Heuristic.
They are designed to determine whether the pricing or the capacity decision is more crucial to the organization. In the Certainty Price Heuristic the marketing group uses the simple pricing rule setting price equal to full cost plus the inverse hazard rate. In contrast, the operations group selects the optimal capacity given the marketing group's heuristic. In a similar spirit, the Certainty Capacity Heuristic has the operations group using the simple heuristic of setting capacity equal to expected demand. Now the marketing group chooses the optimal pricing rule given the operation group's heuristic.
We compare the performance of all three heuristics with the optimal solution in extensive Monte Carlo simulation experiments. Although there are settings where every heuristic performs well, the full cost based Certainty Price Heuristic is the clear winner. In all of our simulation experiments its median performance was better than that of the other two alternatives.
Comparing the Certainty Price and Certainty Capacity Heuristics shows that the capacity decision is more sensitive than the pricing decision. In other words, it is more important to use a sophisticated capacity model than a sophisticated pricing model. The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3, we describe the derivation of the heuristics. In Section 4, we present and discuss our simulation results, and conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of directions for future research.
The Basic Model
In developing our basic model, our objective is to capture the essence of the interdependence between the pricing and capacity decisions while maintaining simplicity and tractability. Our model is loosely based on the set of decisions faced by a muffler replacement facility. At the start of each month the firm determines the service capacity: the number of full and part-time technicians who will be available during the month. The firm then creates and publishes a price list that describes the services the company will perform at set prices.
Customers read the price list, drive to the facility, and order muffler replacement services. If too many customers order during the period, the firm offers customers a price discount if they are willing to wait until the next period for their order to be filled. Figure 1 shows the timeline for our model. At the start of every period t, t = 1, …, T, the firm chooses the service capacity level, t y . Capacity is first committed to fill the prior period's backorders, 1 − t b (we set b 0 = 0), and the remainder x t = y t -b t-1 ≥ 0 is devoted to new orders in the current period. The firm selects the capacity level before knowing the current period demand for its product. The total cost of capacity incurred in period t is k t . Next, the firm sets the current period price 0, > p , p t t at which the firm will sell services, and implicitly capacity, to customers. To simplify the analysis, all customers place service orders for one unit, each order uses one unit of capacity and incurs variable costs of v t , v t > 0.
The firm's revenues are driven by m t potential customers who arrive sequentially every period. Each customer has a reservation price drawn from the continuous probability density f t , where f t ≥ 0 for all p. The customers' reservation prices are independently and identically distributed. Given these assumptions, the probability a customer will wish to place an order is
If a customer is willing to buy at the firm's posted price and capacity is available, then the firm sells the service at the published price and allocates capacity to the customer. If a customer's reservation price is below the posted price, then the customer will not place an order.
If a customer places an order and capacity has been exhausted by prior orders, then the firm offers to discount the price if the customer is willing to backorder. The probability that a customer will accept the discount offer and backorder is w t , where 1 ≥ w t ≥. 0. The manager's incremental cost to service waiting customers will be written as a t > k t , where a t includes the price discount plus the additional cost of purchasing capacity for current sales.
1 Observe that for w = 1, our model resembles the soft capacity setting in Banker and Hughes (1994) where all demand is accommodated even when it exceeds the initially committed capacity. 2 For w = 0, our model resembles the hard capacity setting in Balachandran, Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan (1997) where demand is limited by the initially committed capacity.
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In order to close the model, we need to make one further assumption. During the final period T the firm will still accept backorders. Once the final ordering period is complete, the firm will operate just long enough to fill outstanding backorders before shutting down. This structure is sufficient to ensure that the firm's pricing and capacity decisions for any period are independent of those decisions in all other periods. The optimal solution requires the firm to set 1 If all customers were willing to backorder and the manager did not have to pay backordered customers a price discount, then the firm would wait and only determine capacity after all orders had arrived. In this way the firm could precisely satisfy demand and avoid the possibility of having excess capacity. Cooper and Kaplan (1999) refer to such activity capacity as flexible activity resources. We require a > k to capture the essence of committed activity resources as described by Cooper and Kaplan. 2 Banker and Hughes (1994) . 3 Balachandran, Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan (1997) .
the price p t and the capacity x t available for current orders separately for each period, independent of the choices for other periods.
Since the firm's decision problem is separable over time, we omit the time subscript t. A convenient benchmark next shows how our model is related to several strands of prior research.
The Certainty Benchmark
Our benchmark abstracts away from the random order distribution generated by stochastic reservation prices. When the firm can perfectly forecast demand at the start of every period, it will always commit just enough capacity to satisfy the known demand,
The firm sets each period's price by solving the following program.
The Certainty Pricing Program
The certainty pricing program is very simple. The firm's profits consist of the profit margin (price less full cost) times demand. Since the demand is known ex ante with certainty, the probability of waiting customers and the costs of servicing waiting customers are not present in the firm's pricing program. The first order condition is
The certainty-pricing rule (2) is relatively simple. The price equals full costs, k, + v plus the inverse hazard rate,
. The presence of the inverse hazard rate in (2) highlights the distinction between our model and Hansen and Magee (1993) . Hansen and Magee examine a capacity model where products are supplied to other divisions of the firm. In their setting the
firm captures all the benefits from products, and other divisions are charged only the full cost of production. In contrast, in our model products are sold to customers outside the firm. The only way the firm can generate profits is to charge above cost. The inverse hazard rate trades off the increased profits due to higher prices with the reduction in the number of customers whose reservation prices are above the higher price threshold. Equation (2) reveals that the optimal price under certainty is
. Thus, the accounting system need report only the full cost to support the pricing decision. Equation (2) also provides a second connection to prior work. Rewriting (2) yields the formulation
which is just the classical monopolist's first order condition, except that the right hand side is the full cost because under certainty, the capacity cost behaves like a variable or flexible resource rather than a committed activity resource.
Capacity equation (1) and pricing equation (2) jointly comprise the certainty benchmark. Now that we have demonstrated how the benchmark setting works, we will investigate the full model with stochastic demand.
The Full Model
We use two convenient approximations in order to simplify the analysis. In our model, given a posted price p, the probability that a customer places an order is (1 -F(p) With these approximations, the manager's maximization program can be written as a sequence of separable, period by period, programs. In each period the manager maximizes the expected value of capacity devoted to current demand plus the expected value of backorders.
Suppressing the time subscripts, we write:
Integrating out the backorder distribution and rearranging terms provides the following mathematical program.
The Optimization Program
The Optimization Program contains two integrals. The first provides the expected marginal profits when current orders are less than the capacity devoted to current period orders. The second shows the expected marginal profits when current orders are greater than capacity for 4 Treating the number of orders as a discrete variable adds additional notation without generating any additional insight. 
The Capacity Decision
Differentiating the Optimization Program with respect to x generates the capacity first order condition
The elements in equation (3) are intuitive. The left hand side is the expected fraction of customers not served by the capacity for current sales. The right hand side contains the ratio of the opportunity cost of purchasing one more unit of capacity for current sales over the opportunity costs of lost customers and use of backorders. Combining the left and right hand sides, equation (3) states that the fraction of unserved customers depends on the ratio of the cost of excess and insufficient capacity for current sales.
The capacity choice (3) is similar to the inventory choice in the classical news vendor problem. In the news vendor problem, the firm selects capacity so that the fractile of customers serviced equates the expected costs of over-and under-capacity. 5 While the results are similar, our model is not restricted to a news vendor setting. The major distinction is that in the news vendor problem the price and the stochastic demand function are exogenously fixed. In contrast, in our setting the properties of the demand function are partially under the control of the firm.
The firm endogenously selects the stochastic demand distribution by influencing the mean and the variance of the sequence of customer orders with its price choice.
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As with any first order conditions, equation (3) shows the optimal capacity choice given any price, not just the optimal one. This observation serves as the basis for the Certainty Pricing
Heuristic described later in the paper.
Using standard properties of the normal distribution, we can rewrite (3) as follows.
Proposition 1. The optimal capacity choice solves
Proposition 1 shows that the firm chooses capacity for current sales equal to the expected demand plus a multiple of the standard deviation. The multiplier depends upon the ratio of the marginal cost of excess capacity and the opportunity costs when there is insufficient capacity.
The multiplier ) ( p τ can be negative. If no customers are willing to wait, w=0, the multiplier
, that is, the multiplier depends upon the ratio of the gross profit to the contribution margin. If all customers are willing to wait, w=1, the multiplier
, which demonstrates that the multiplier depends on the relative cost of the price discount paid to the waiting customers, (a-k)/a = (price discount)/(cost of waiting customers).
In the benchmark certainty solution the firm commits capacity for current sales equal to expected demand. The following corollary describes a specialized setting where the stochastic capacity rule (4) yields the same capacity choice as in the deterministic setting.
Corollary 1.1. The firm will commit current capacity equal to expected current period
, when the ratio of additional capacity cost to insufficient capacity costs is one-half,
Two special cases are:
(a) If all customers are willing to wait, 1 = w , then capacity equals expected demand when backorder costs is twice as expensive as current capacity, k a 2 = .
(b) If no customers are willing to wait, 0 = w , then capacity equals expected demand when the contribution margin equals twice the cost of current capacity,
The intuition behind Corollary 1.1 is straightforward. Equation (5) implicitly equates the expected costs of over-and under-capacity. When the firm purchases a unit of capacity for current sales it pays k for certain, yielding an expected cost of . ) )( 1 ( k k = When the firm sets capacity equal to expected demand, the expected cost is
We can rewrite condition (5) in a form that highlights its connection to our pricing heuristics. Condition (5) can be rewritten as
When the optimal capacity equals expected demand, the optimal price equals full costs plus a strictly positive markup. Now that we have described the capacity choice, we turn to examining the pricing decision.
The Pricing Decision
In our model no information is revealed between the choice of capacity and the price selection. Therefore we can treat both choices as occurring simultaneously. Using the capacity first order condition (4) and following the sequence of steps in the Appendix, the pricing program can be written as follows.
The Pricing Program
The Pricing Program begins with the certainty profits and subtracts off a penalty that captures the additional costs due to stochastic orders. The penalty has two elements. The first element reflects the marginal impact of not having a unit of capacity for current sales. The firm
loses the expected contribution margin from the customers who are unwilling to wait,
, and also incurs expected additional costs for those customers who do wait, wa .
The second element in the penalty, the exponential term, requires additional explanation. The
. Combining this observation with the fact that the capacity equation (4) can be rewritten as
which shows that the exponential penalty term is symmetric about the mean demand and is greatest when capacity for current sales equals demand. The reason for the bell shape is the change in the order probabilities as the capacity approaches the mean. If the firm originally chooses a low level of capacity and increases the capacity in the direction of the mean demand, then there are two effects. First, the probabilities that the actual total order is one unit under-or one unit over-capacity both increase. Second, since the order probabilities increase in the direction of the mean, the probability that the order will be one unit over-capacity increases faster than the probability that the order will be one unit under-capacity. Similarly, if the firm originally has a very high level of capacity and decreases capacity toward the mean, then both the probability of over-and under-capacity will increase. Because the original capacity was above the mean, the probability that the order is one unit under-capacity will increase faster than the probability that the order is one unit over-capacity. When the capacity exactly equals the mean, the combined probabilities of over-and under-capacity are at the maximum, and the manager has the greatest costs due to stochastic orders.
The following proposition discusses the pricing decisions. , then the firm uses the pricing first order condition given by:
and chooses capacity using the capacity first order condition (4).
Case 2. If the optimal price is less than the variable cost plus the cost of waiting
, then the firm does not allow customers to backorder, and uses the pricing first order condition given by:
and chooses capacity using the capacity first order condition (4) with w=0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The pricing rules (8) and (9) are difficult to calculate, though straightforward to describe.
The pricing rules depend upon the variable costs of production [v] , the marginal costs of
and two additional terms which reflect the change in the stochastic penalty. The first term captures the increase in the per unit opportunity loss when the manager raises prices, while the second captures the shift in the probability that the capacity for current sales will be insufficient (over-sufficient) to satisfy expected demand.
Observe that the cost parameters v, k and a appear separately in several different terms.
Therefore, unlike the Simple Certainty Heuristic, an aggregated cost such as the full cost, does not suffice for the optional pricing decision. Also observe that the capacity choice enters the pricing decision though the τ(p) term, and the price choice enters the capacity decision from the dependence of τ(p) on p. Thus, the two decisions are inter-dependent, and cannot be decentralized.
Proposition 2 shows that there are two qualitatively distinct solutions to the Optimization
Program. If the incremental cost of waiting customers is too high, v+a is large, then it is optimal not to allow customers to wait. The manager concentrates on obtaining the greatest benefit from capacity available for current sales. On the other hand, if the incremental cost of waiting customers is comparatively low, v + a is low, then the firm will consider the impact of backorders on both the price and current capacity decisions.
We have now described the firm's capacity and pricing choices. The optimal choices are complex, interdependent and difficult to calculate. Given this complexity, it is worthwhile to consider whether simpler heuristics can approach the optimal profits.
The Heuristics
We investigate three heuristics which are variations of the benchmark certainty setting. Simple Certainty Heuristic uses the benchmark certainty solution to generate heuristics for both choices. The Certainty Price Heuristic uses the benchmark pricing rule and has the optimal capacity choice given this price. The Certainty Capacity Heuristic is the opposite of the Certainty Price Heuristic. Now the capacity choice uses the heuristic, while the price is the optimal one given the capacity choice. The Certainty Price and Certainty Capacity Heuristics are partially optimized solutions. The case when the firm chooses the optimal capacity given the price and the optimal price given the capacity, corresponds to the optimal solution.
Since the Simple Certainty Heuristic uses heuristics for both decisions, we anticipate that it will have poorer performance than either the Certainty Price or the Certainty Capacity
Heuristics.
By comparing the performance in the diagonal heuristics in Table 1 , we will be able to determine the more important decision for the firm. For instance, if the Certainty Pricing
Heuristic performs better than the Certainty Capacity Heuristic, then optimizing over the capacity would be more important than optimizing the price.
In addition to allowing an interesting experiment, our three heuristics have three additional appealing features. The heuristics are all loosely based upon practice, are fairly easy to calculate, and lead to decentralized decision making.
The Simple Certainty Heuristic
The Simple Certainty Heuristic uses both the benchmark price and capacity choices as approximate solutions in the full stochastic setting. It decentralizes the firm's pricing and capacity decisions into three parts. First, the accounting department calculates the full cost as the aggregate of the variable and fixed costs, v + k. It then passes this cost information to the marketing department who forecasts the elasticity of demand (the inverse hazard rate), and sets the price using the heuristic rule
The marketing department then sends their price to the operations department, which uses the heuristic capacity rule and purchases capacity equal to expected demand,
The certainty pricing rule (2) has a direct connection to accounting practice.
The pricing rule is a form of full cost pricing. The firm apparently charges each customer a budgeted amount that equals the variable and fixed costs of capacity, [v + k] , plus a positive
. This rule is related to linear pricing approximations for several special cases.
Proposition 3.
(1) If the reservation prices have a Pareto density, 1 , ) ( 
Proposition 3 shows that for very specific distributions the pricing heuristic takes a very simple form. One interesting feature of Proposition 3 is that it allows us to relate the price and the distribution of underlying consumer preferences. Both pricing rules in Proposition 3 imply that the manager only sells to customers with reservation prices above the population mean. In other words, the firm only sells to the upper tail of the customer price distribution.
The Simple Certainty Heuristic assumes that both the marketing and operations departments use heuristics to select the price and capacity, respectively. It assumes that both departments use simple "rules of thumb" to determine their actions. The second and third heuristics relax this assumption. They both allow one of the two departments to use a heuristic rule, while the other department optimizes against the rule.
The Certainty Price Heuristic
The Certainty Price Heuristic follows a similar sequence as the Simple Certainty
Heuristic. First, the accounting department calculates the full cost as the aggregate of the variable and fixed cost charges, v + k. It then passes this information to the marketing department who forecast the elasticity of demand (the inverse hazard rate), and set the price using the heuristic rule
The marketing department then sends their price to the operations department. The accounting department sends its estimate of k/ [(1-w) (p-v) + aw], the ratio of the cost of additional capacity to the opportunity cost of insufficient capacity. The operations department uses marketing's price and accounting's relative cost estimates to determine the optimal capacity choice given the price. Operations selects capacity for new sales, x, to solve
The Certainty Capacity Heuristic
The Certainty Capacity Heuristic reverses the relative structure of the Certainty Price Heuristic by assuming that the operations department uses a simple capacity rule while the marketing department selects the optimal price given operation's capacity choice.
There is an additional reason for examining the Certainty Capacity Heuristic. Corollary 1.1 shows that there are situations where the optimal solution is to purchase capacity equal to expected demand. Investigating the performance of the Certainty Capacity Heuristics will provide evidence about the robustness of this special case.
The Certainty Capacity Heuristic follows a similar three-stage procedure as the other heuristics. First, the accounting department calculates the full cost as an aggregate of the variable and fixed costs. It then passes these charges to the marketing department who selects the price using the following rule, derived in the Appendix, (11) is derived from the Optimization Program. Equation (11) provides the firm's optimal price assuming that operations will be setting capacity equal to expected demand
The final step is that operations follows through and uses their simplified capacity rule,
Now that we have described our heuristics, we will investigate the circumstances where each performs best. The next section describes the results of extensive simulation experiments.
We examine how well these heuristics perform versus the optimal solution and each other.
The Monte Carlo Experiments.
Using the functional choices, we created a program to calculate the optimal and the heuristical solutions. The logic flow of the program is as follows. First, we calculate the Simple Certainty Heuristic and use these numbers as the starting values for calculating the optimal solution. We then solve for the optimal solution assuming that the solution falls into the simpler Case 2 (no backordering). If this preliminary solution does indeed satisfy the Case 2 condition, p < v + a, then the optimal solution is Case 2. However, if the preliminary solution does not satisfy this condition, then we solve for Case 1 (backordering) which represents the optimal solution. By our program's construction, the Case 1 solution always takes more time to calculate than the Case 2 solution. Once the optimal solution is generated, Case, the program then calculates the Certainty Price and Certainty Capacity Heuristics. The simulations were programmed in LISP and ran inside Mathematica. Mathematica, was implemented on an HP Vectra IBM clone with a Pentium Chip.
The average run time per iteration was 258 seconds. Even for our simple setting, the firm faces a substantial calculation burden. Ninety-six percent of the calculation time was spent in finding the optimal solution. On average, calculating the Certainty Price Heuristic took only 1.20% as long as finding the optimal solution. The Simple Certainty Heuristic took only .99% of the optimal solution time, while the Certainty Capacity Heuristic took 1.12% of the time. This result highlights an important justification for using simple heuristics instead of the complex optional solution. Given the long calculation time for the optimal solution, we investigated which parameters cause the problems. Table 3 shows the results of regressing the optimal solution calculation time on the model parameters. The results indicate that the calculation time increases in the number of potential customers, and decreases in the customer backorder costs, waiting percentage, and the distribution shape parameter. The results are mainly intuitive. As the number of customers increases, the standard deviation of the customer order distribution increases, the ordering distribution becomes flatter, and it becomes more difficult to find the point at which the objective function is maximized. As backorder costs increase or the percentage of waiting customers decreases, fewer customers backorder and the solutions overwhelmingly fall into the simpler Case 2 category. By our program's construction, Case 2 solutions take less time. The run time decrease in the shape parameter indicates that the calculations are quicker for the more symmetric distribution. Now that the programming structure has been discussed, we can describe the particular parameter choices used in our simulations. A necessary precursor is that we completely parameterize all functions in the firm's maximization program. Almost all of the firm's choices have already been specified. The one remaining choice is to select the potential customers'
which displays a wide variety of shapes. In particular, by varying the c parameter from 1 to 3.6, the distribution moves from an exponential shape to approximately log-normal, to gamma, and finally to normal (Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan, . As c changes, the distribution evolves from highly asymmetric to symmetric. We label our first experiment as the base case. Table 3 , Column 1 describes the base case parameter choices. The base case was chosen to meet three criteria. First, the base parameters should generate differences in performance across the different heuristics. We calculated fifty random numerical iterations of the base case. The median had the following profit performance: Simple Certainty 96.16%, Certainty Price 99.24%, and Certainty Capacity 96.65%. The mean profit performance over all fifty iterations was:
Simple Certainty 89.97%, Certainty Price 92.69%, and Certainty Capacity 90.61%. Second, on average, the base case should have an optimal capacity for current orders close to the expected demand. In the base setting the average τ(p) for the optimal solution was 0.062. Finally, the base case should contain a mix of Case 1 (backordering) and Case 2 (no backordering) solutions. In the base setting there were about 40% Case 1 and about 60% Case 2 solutions. We ran many different experiments to evaluate the performance of the heuristics under varied circumstances.
The second column of Table 3 describes the specific variations we examined. Every experiment consisted of randomly generating fifty iterations and calculating the heuristics' performance for each. We ran twenty-three distinct experiments and thus generated 1,150 data points. The average τ(p) for the optimal solution in the entire set of simulations was 0.0406. On average, the optimal solution set current capacity equal to expected demand plus .0406 times the standard deviation of demand. In all 1150 examples, 57.14% were Case 1 and 42.86% were Case 2.
Before discussing results from the individual experiments, we describe global results for all 1,150 examples. The global patterns are strong. As anticipated, the Simple Certainty Heuristic performed worse than the other two heuristics. The median ratio of heuristic profits is optimal profits for the Simple Certainty iterations was 97.14%, while it was 97.41% for the Certainty Capacity Heuristic, and 99.59% for the Certainty Price Heuristic. However, the Certainty Capacity Heuristic generated only a very small improvement over the Simple Certainty percentage of customers willing to wait (backorder). As the percentage increases, the performance for all heuristics declines. This behavior is due to the effect the waiting percentage has on the Pricing Program. As the waiting percentage increases, the stochastic ordering penalty increases. Panel C varies the relative importance of variable costs to capacity costs. As the variable costs become more important (and capacity costs relatively less important), the heuristics do not perform as well. The reason is simple. As the capacity decision declines in importance, heuristics that focus on getting the "correct" capacity decision begin to fail. Panel D examines the impact of increasing the firm's backorder costs relative to the capacity costs.
The Simple Certainty and, to some extent, the Certainty Capacity Heuristic rely upon the assumption that there will be no waiting customers. As the backorder costs rise, there are fewer waiting customers and these heuristics' performance improves. The performance of the Certainty Price Heuristic is the opposite of the other two heuristics. The Certainty Price Heuristic assumes that customers can be induced to wait, that is, the solution is Case 1. As the backorder costs increase, more of the examples fall into Case 2 (no backorders) and the Certainty Price Heuristic's performance declines. Panel E provides information about the effect of the distribution's shape on the results. The panel indicates that as the distribution becomes more symmetric (approaches normal), the heuristics perform less well. Supplemental analysis shows that this result is again due to the impact of Case 2 solutions. In our specific set of examples, greater distributional symmetry (a higher c) leads to an increase in the likelihood of a Case 2 solution.
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Now that we have examined the experiments in detail, we will report one additional analysis for the Certainty Price Heuristic. Table 4 In addition to the three heuristics analyzed above, we also investigated the performance of four alternative heuristics that investigate different aspects of our model. The first two alternative heuristics examined whether we could further simplify the certainty price heuristic to 7 A logistic regression of a Case 2 dummy variable on the model parameters shows that Case 2 solutions are more likely when the cost of capacity and distribution scale parameters are low, and the variable costs, backorder costs, and shape parameter are high. Note that the number of potential customers was not a significant factor in whether the solution was Case 1 or 2. a linear pricing rule. These two alternative heuristics substituted linear pricing rules (6) or (10) for the nonlinear pricing rule (2) in the Certainty Pricing Heuristic. Both of these heuristics perform very poorly 8 , indicating that we do need to include the nonlinear inverse hazard rate in the price heuristic to obtain acceptable results. The second two alternative heuristics investigated whether the performance of the Certainty Pricing Heuristic was affected by decentralization. We created two additional decentralized heuristics by modifying the Certainty Price and Certainty Capacity Heuristics to incorporate a target multiplier in the capacity choice (4). We required the firm to set current capacity equal to expected demand plus a fixed multiple, z, of the standard deviation of demand. While both of these modified heuristics performed better than the first two alternatives, neither came close to reaching the performance of the Certainty Price Heuristic. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examined how simple full cost based heuristics can be adequate, while not sufficient, in solving the capacity and pricing decisions for a service company. We set up a basic model of capacity and pricing choices and examined the performance of several decentralized heuristics in approaching the profits from the complex, interdependent optimal solution. We found that the heuristics performed very well. The worst of our three heuristics had a median performance of 97.14% of the optimal profits. Comparing the performance of different heuristics revealed that a sophisticated approach to selecting capacity, while relying upon a simple pricing rule, generated close to optimal profits.
In our model there is always a probability that the firm will have excess or insufficient capacity. In contrast to prior work, we do not require that once the demand parameters are realized, demand is known for certain for the period. In addition, we do not assume that the firm can always lower the price sufficiently to "fill the factory" and always fully utilize its capacity.
If all customers are willing to wait, then the backorder costs become the cost of soft capacity in our model. However, we also vary the parameter representing the percentage of waiting customers to levels below 100%.
There are two logical extensions to our model that can be pursued in future research. In our model, new capacity levels are selected every period. While many activity resources, such as labor, can be adjusted every period, there are others, such as the number of repair bays, which can only be changed over a longer time period. An extension could examine the impact of the capacity choice lasting for two periods. The most important change from the present model is that now the pricing decisions are linked across the two periods. Since the backorders for period one reduce the capacity for new orders in period two, the prices for periods one and two are now jointly determined. In this setting the optimal pricing rules are likely to be much more complex than in our present model, and the need for good heuristics is even more apparent.
A second simplifying assumption of our model is that no additional demand information arrives between the capacity decision and the pricing decision. However, there are many situations where simple pieces of information, such as a competitor handing out discount coupons, will have a major impact on the distribution of current orders. A second extension could allow for the firm to update its demand distribution after the capacity decision has been made. The heuristics could be modified to allow the marketing department to use this updated distribution in making the pricing decision.
In this study, we have taken the initial step in evaluating an economic rationale for the use of simple full cost based pricing heuristics. The heuristics we consider are decentralized, and allow for pricing and capacity decisions to be made separately without the complex simultaneous consideration of the interdependence between the two decisions. A major benefit from using these simple heuristics is the very substantial, nearly a hundred-fold, reduction in the computation time compared to the optimal solution of the pricing and capacity decisions. While the heuristics, and aggregated information on which they are based, are not economically sufficient for an optimal solution to these decision problems, a surprising result of our study has been their near adequacy in achieving nearly 99% of the optimal profits. Future research must evaluate the nature of these tradeoffs between computation time and profits realized as increasingly complex decision settings are considered. The base case does not randomize over the number of potential customers in order to remove a potentially confounding effect: the heuristics converge to the optimal solution as the number of potential customers becomes very large. * Performance is defined as the ratio of the heuristic's expected profit to the optimal expected profit.
***Significant at the 1% level
Appendix. Proofs for the Basic Model

A. Derivation of The Pricing Program
The Capacity Program can be rewritten as
Inserting in the formula
and simplifying provides The next step uses a minor variant of the formula for the mean of a truncated normal distribution [Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan, 1994, p. 156 The only missing piece in (A8) is dp (p) dτ . The definition of (p) τ in (7) can be rewritten as Differentiating both sides of (A9) with respect to p and rearranging terms generates Inserting (A10) into (A8) and canceling out common terms leads to equation (8) 
